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III. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Miller and Kimball's Brief asks this Court to review this 
appeal through only two bodies of law; the finality of Default 
Judgments and the Doctrine of Merger, neither of which addresses 
this case's unique circumstances. Martineau's objection to the 
foreclosure is based upon (1) Miller and Kimball's independent 
contractual obligation, assumed by Miller and Kimball after the 
Default Judgment, to honor Martineau's Lease and (2) the improper 
use of the foreclosure process to foreclose Martineau's Lease, 
without the genuine purpose of satisfying a lien or debt. 
IV. 
ARGUMENT 
A. THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT DID NOT ADDRESS, OR DISPOSE OF, THE 
ISSUES RAISED BY MARTINEAU'S MOTIONS. THEREFORE, RULE 60(b)IS 
NOT THE PROPER CONTEXT IN WHICH TO RESOLVE MARTINEAU'S 
MOTIONS. 
1. The Default Judgment Did Not Constitute a Judgment on 
Miller and Kimball's Subsequent Lease Assumption. 
Miller and Kimball contend that Martineau has no standing to 
object to the foreclosure unless the Default Judgment is first set 
aside. Miller and Kimball's argument, and the trial court's 
ruling, incorrectly overlook the limited scope of the Default 
Judgment and the new and independent issues raised by Martineau. 
1 
Judge Noel entered Default Judgment on March 5, 1993 in favor 
of Republic Capitol Bank, declaring that Martineaufs leasehold 
interest "is inferior, junior and subordinate to the lien of 
[Republic]". (R. 473) The Court did not then extinguish Martineaufs 
interest. Rather, the leasehold remained until extinguished and 
terminated "upon the execution sale of the property". (R. 474) 
There was no order in place preventing a new landlord from assuming 
the Martineau lease or entering into new contractual covenants not 
to terminate Martineaufs lease. That is precisely what Miller and 
Kimball did. 
After the Default Judgment, but before Martineaufs interest 
was extinguished at a foreclosure sale, Miller and Kimball made 
contractual covenants to honor the still viable Martineau Lease. 
Miller and Kimball contracted, in an Assignment of Leases "(a) to 
observe and perform all obligations imposed upon Lessor under the 
leases." [Paragraph 2.] (R.1165, Addendum 9 Page 1). One of the 
lease provisions assumed by Miller and Kimball specifically 
addresses Miller and Kimball's obligation in the event of 
foreclosure; 
So long as Lessee is not in default under the 
terms of this lease, however, this lease shall 
remain in full force and effect for the full 
term hereof and shall not be terminated as a 
result of any foreclosure (or transfer in lieu 
thereof) of such mortgage or other security 
instrument to which Lessee has subordinated 
its rights pursuant to this subparagraph. 
(R.ll 65, Addendum 2, Paragraph 33). 
(emphasis added.) 
2 
These contractual obligations had not been assumed by Miller 
and Kimball when the Default was entered. Moreover, Martineaufs 
interests had not yet been extinguished. Therefore, Martineau had 
standing to raise new objections to the foreclosure which were not 
inconsistent with the prior ruling regarding Republic!s priority. 
Therefore the Motion to Set Aside the Default is irrelevant to 
Martineau!s objections and other motions. 
2. The Default Judgment Did Not Constitute a Judgment on the 
Effect of Miller and Kimballfs Subsequent Release of the 
1986 Trust Deed or the Propriety of Miller and Kimball's 
Use of Foreclosure Proceedings under the Newly Created 
Debt Circumstances. 
Another reason that the Default Judgment is not the proper 
context to address this case is that the Default Judgment did not 
address the issue of whether Miller and Kimball, who were not even 
parties to the Default Judgment, could foreclose on a forgiven debt 
for a purpose other than satisfying a lien or debt. 
The debt on the 1986 Trust Deed was forgiven, after the 
Default Judgment. (R.1165, Addendum 4 p.12). The Default Judgment 
did not address the question of whether a foreclosure sale should 
proceed on the basis of the 1986 Trust Deed, after that debt was 
forgiven and for a purpose unrelated to that debt. Therefore, the 
trial court erred when it relied upon the Default Judgment. 
The legal issue overlooked or ignored by the trial court and 
by Miller and Kimball is the following: 
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If Republic's attorneys had drafted the original Complaint to 
proclaim that Martineaufs interest ceased as of the moment of any 
judgment and that Martineau had no further protections from 
foreclosure abuses or rights with respect to the sale of the 
property, Martineau could have (and would have) objected to the 
form of a resulting judgment. However, the Complaint only alleged 
and the Default Judgment only declared that Martineau!s interest 
was inferior and that, upon sale, Martineau*s rights would be 
terminated. Unfortunately, the trial court misread and 
misinterpreted the Default Judgment as declaring that Martineau!s 
interest were terminated and that Martineaufs rights to address the 
court regarding the sale were terminated as of the date of the 
default, rather than as of the date of the sale. Miller and 
Kimball ask this court to make the same error. 
The trial court should have recognized that Martineau raised 
rights and objections to the foreclosure sale which stood 
independent of and subsequent to the Default Judgment and which 
were not inconsistent with the Default Judgment. The Default 
Judgment, whether set aside or not, is not a judgment on the issues 
raised by Martineaufs motion in enjoin the foreclosure sale. 
B. EVEN IF THE JUDGMENT DEFAULT IS RELEVANT, THE TRIAL COURT 
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING MARTINEAUTS MOTION TO SET THE 
JUDGMENT ASIDE. 
If the Default Judgment is relevant to the issues raised 
before the trial court, the trial court abused its discretion by 
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(1) incorrectly assuming Martineau could have raised its objections 
eighteen (18) months earlier (before the grounds for Martineau1s 
objections had arisen) and (2) failing to recognize Martineau1 s 
good faith interpretation regarding the limited scope of the 
Default Judgment. 
Miller and Kimball rely heavily on the trial court's finding 
that there was an eighteen (18) month delay between the Default 
Judgment and the Motion to set the Default Judgment aside. This 
reliance upon eighteen (18) months illustrates the trial court's 
mistake. Eighteen (18) months before Martineau moved to set the 
judgment aside, Miller and Kimball had not contracted to honor 
leases and had not released Associates from the 1986 Trust Deed. 
Under the grounds asserted by Martineau, Rule 60(b) requires action 
within a "reasonable time". It is patently unreasonable 
(impossible) to expect a motion to be filed before the events 
underlying the motion have transpired. As explained in Martineau's 
opening brief, Martineau immediately filed its motion to dismiss 
when it learned the terms of the Miller and Kimball transaction. 
The Default Judgment's conclusion that Republic's interest had 
priority was not relevant to the new circumstances. At the time of 
the Motion to Dismiss, there was a new Plaintiff, a new agreement 
and the debt underlying the 1986 Trust Deed had been forgiven. 
Accordingly, there was no unreasonable delay. At the very least, 
Martineau's interpretation of the meaning of the Default Judgment 
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was a sufficiently reasonable basis for the court to set aside that 
judgment and address the case on its merits. 
Martineau still does not dispute Republic's priority under the 
circumstances existing at the time of the Default Judgment. It is 
not the Court's conclusion at the time of the Default Judgment with 
which Martineau disagrees. Accordingly, Martineau had no reason to 
ask the Court to set that judgment aside until Miller and Kimball 
asked the trial court to treat the Default Judgment as a ruling 
regarding circumstances which the Default Judgment had not 
entertained. 
C. MILLER AND KIMBALL FAILED TO MEET THEIR BURDEN OF PROVING THAT 
THEY ARE NOT BOUND BY THE LEASE OBLIGATIONS WHICH THE RECORD 
SHOWS THEY ASSUMED. 
Miller and Kimball briefly acknowledge Martineaufs allegations 
regarding Miller and Kimball's lease covenants. (Appellee's Brief, 
Page 33) Miller and Kimball change the subject by stating "What 
Martineau is really arguing is that the trial court allegedly erred 
in concluding that the merger doctrine did not apply." Id. To the 
contrary, what Martineau is really arguing is that, regardless of 
whether Miller and Kimball's legal title merged with the lien, 
Miller and Kimball contracted not to terminate the lease. Nowhere 
do Miller and Kimball refute these contractual terms or that they 
were assumed by Miller and Kimball. The Lessor's covenant, adopted 
in the Assignment of Leases and in the new Trust Deed assumes that 
there is no merger. Yet it provides that: 
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So long Lessee is not in default under the 
terms of the lease, however, this lease shall 
remain in full force and effect for the full 
term hereof and shall not be terminated as a 
result of any foreclosure (or transfer in lieu 
thereof) of such mortgage or other security 
instrument to which Lessee has subordinated 
its rights pursuant to this subparagraph. (R. 
1165 Addendum 2, Paragraph 33.) (emphasis 
added.) 
By its own terms, the above provision protects Martineau even 
if there is no merger and the foreclosure is otherwise proper. 
Miller and Kimball fail to adequately refute this contractual 
obligation. 
As Miller and Kimball address their contractual promises by 
relying on case law regarding merger, it should be noted that those 
cases do not address similar contractual commitments by foreclosing 
parties. For example, Miller and Kimball rely upon Federal Land 
Bank of Wichita v. Colorado National Bank of Denver, 786 P.2d 514 
(Colo. App. 1989) . In Federal Land Bank, a mortgagor, gave a Trust 
Deed to a mortgagee, in lieu of foreclosure. Colorado National 
Bank contended that its junior lien was not extinguished on the 
basis of the merger doctrine. Miller and Kimball correctly note 
that the Colorado Court of Appeals rejected the merger on the basis 
of the mortgagee's intent. However, Federal Land Bank did not 
agree to take the Deed in lieu of foreclosure subject to the lien 
of Colorado National Bank. The Court was not faced with a promise 
by the foreclosing company to honor the inferior interest. 
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In contrast, Miller and Kimball contracted to be bound by the 
terms of the lease. O'Reilly v. McLean, et al.. 37 P.2d 770 (Utah 
1934) is similarly distinguishable. There, the Defendant claimed 
that the Plaintiff could not proceed with her foreclosure because 
her equitable title and her mortgage had merged. The Utah Supreme 
Court rejected the argument on the basis of intention inconsistent 
with a merger. Again, the foreclosing mortgage holder did not take 
title concurrent with a promise to recognize and honor the rights 
of an inferior interest holder. Miller and Kimball did purchase 
their interest subject to such a promise to Martineau. Miller and 
Kimball cannot deny a contractual promise to honor interests of 
the Lessees. This shifts the burden to them to find a legal basis 
for making those contractual obligations invalid. No such legal 
basis has been suggested. The absence of merger falls short of a 
reason to breach their contractual obligations. 
D. PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY PROHIBIT MILLER AND KIMBALL FROM USING A 
FORECLOSURE FOR AN IMPROPER PURPOSE. 
1. Miller and Kimballfs Foreclosure Is a Misuse of the 
Foreclosure Remedy. 
Miller and Kimball purchased the property for $750,000, 
creating a new Trust Deed in the amount of $550,000 (R. 1116-17). 
Because Miller and Kimball already owned the Judge Building which 
they were foreclosing, the sole remaining purpose of the 
foreclosure was to terminate Martineaufs Lease (and no other 
existing tenant's lease). By subordinating the new Trust Deed to 
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the 1986 Trust Deed, any interested buyer at the foreclosure sale 
would now have to bid $2,200,000 and would still be subject to 
Lender's new Trust Deed of $550,000. Essentially, Miller and 
Kimball were foreclosing against themselves to terminate one 
selected lease in the Judge Building, having previously released 
the original obligor of the 1986 Trust Deed (Associates) from any 
further liability. (R. 1165, Addendum No. 4, p. 12). There was no 
obligation to pay the original debt of 2.3 million dollars to 
Republic, but Miller and Kimball proceeded toward a Sherifffs sale 
although the mortgage underlying the foreclosure would have no 
bearing on any exchange of money or any payment of any debt. 
Although the purpose of a foreclosure sale is to pay a debt, this 
foreclosure sale was structured to discourage bidders at the 
Sheriff's sale and only to terminate one selected lease which the 
foreclosure company had covenanted to honor. 
A judicially supervised foreclosure sale should protect 
everyone's rights. A foreclosure designed to discourage bidders 
and increase the bid prize to foreclose on a released debt to 
terminate a lease in conflict with the language of Miller and 
Kimball's agreement is inequitable. As part of the June 21, 1993 
transaction, Associates was released from its liability to the 
lender. (R. 1165 Addendum 4 Page 12). As one treatise explained, 
The debt is the principle and the mortgage is 
merely incident, and the question is, not 
whether the mortgage is merged, but whether 
the acquisition by one person of both the 
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mortgaged land and the debt secured by the 
mortgage has the effect of extinguishing or 
merging the debt. If the debt is extinguished 
under such circumstances, the mortgage lien is 
necessarily also extinguished, while if the 
debt remains, the mortgage lien also remains. 
Tiffany, Law Real Property, Section 1479 Page 504. 
A judicial foreclosure sale intentionally designed to (1) 
discourage bidders, (2) with an artificially high debt, (3) which 
is forgiven and released, and (4) for the sole purpose of 
terminating a lease to which the Trust Deed beneficiary is bound, 
is not equitable. 
2. The body of merger law relied upon by Miller and Kimball, 
arises out of and addresses a very different 
circumstance. 
Miller and Kimball ask this Court to rely upon a line of cases 
(hereinafter the "merger cases") which address a fundamentally 
different circumstance than the one before this Court. In each of 
the merger cases, the court allows the foreclosure because the 
foreclosing party is using the process to obtain the financial 
benefits contemplated by the mortgage agreement being foreclosed. 
In contrast, Miller and Kimball are not foreclosing to reduce or 
pay the underlying 1986 Trust Deed or for any reason related to the 
1986 Trust Deed. 
Miller and Kimball's cases share the following basic pattern: 
A mortgagor or interest holder deeds the mortgaged property to a 
mortgagee in lieu of money owed to the mortgagee. The mortgagee 
attempts to use the foreclosure process as a way of being paid the 
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underlying debt. A junior lienholder contends that the mortgagor's 
interest and the mortgagee's interest have merged, precluding a 
foreclosure sale. The Court recognizes the separate estates in the 
property in order to facilitate payment of the debt. 
In contrast, Miller and Kimball are not conducting a 
foreclosure sale for any purpose related to the 1986 Trust Deed. 
Rather, Miller and Kimball have subordinated their own mortgage to 
a 2.3 million dollar mortgage so that there will be no bid on the 
building which will generate money. There will be no money 
contemplated which will go to pay any debt or to be paid to any 
creditor. The sole purpose of the foreclosure in this case was to 
extinguish one (of many) leases at the building. 
Federal Land Bank of Wichita v. Colorado National Bank of 
Denver, 786 P.2d 514 (Colo. App. 1989), Altabet v. Monro Methodist 
Church. 777 P.2d 544 (Wash. App. 1989), Whiteley v. Devries, et 
al., 209 P.2d 206 (Utah 1949) and Korb v. Minneapolis Threashing 
Machine Company, 3 P.2d 502 (Kan. 1931) all relied upon by Miller 
and Kimball as representative of the Merger Cases, basically follow 
the above scenario. Similarly, in O'Reilly v. McLean, et al. , 37 
P.2d 770 (Utah 1934), the Utah Supreme Court explicitly noted that 
the mortgagee which was selling the property was doing so in order 
to pay a mortgage debt. O'Reilly was a mortgagee attempting to 
foreclose. O'Reilly had received a Quit Claim Deed to the 
mortgaged property. Although the Supreme Court found that there 
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was no merger and that O'Reilly could foreclose, it was also clear 
that the purpose of selling the property was to obtain payment of 
a debt. 
It further conclusively appears that when 
Gardner entered into negotiations with 
Intervener for the sale of the property. . . 
the Plaintiff still was claiming under her 
mortgage, for Intervener was then informed by 
Gardner, that he was paying off the mortgage 
and that Intervener would have to assume this 
mortgage in the purchase. Later, he informed 
Intervener that Plaintiff wanted her mortgage 
paid rather than assumed, and Intervener 
agreed to pay it. 
Id. at 773. 
Miller and Kimball abused the foreclosure remedy by using the 
1986 Trust Deed as a pretense for the foreclosure, without serving 
any purpose related to the 1986 Trust Deed. 
E. THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF ATTORNEYS FEES EXCEEDED THE SCOPE 
OF RULE 65A AND THE COURT FAILED TO EXAMINE THE NATURE OF THE 
FEES. 
To the extent that a preliminary injunction was verbally 
ordered by the trial court, it expired by its own terms after ten 
days or was continued by stipulation. Whether stipulated or 
expired, the preliminary injunction did not justify an award of any 
fees incurred after that ten day period. 
Rule 65A(b)(2) reads in pertinent part: 
The order shall expire by its terms within 
such time after entry, not to exceed ten days, 
as the court fixes, unless within the time so 
fixed the order, for good cause shown, is 
extended for a like period or unless the party 
against whom the order is directed consents 
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that it may be extended for a longer period. 
The reasons for the extension shall be entered 
of record. (emphasis added). 
More than thirteen (13) months of delay regarding the 
preliminary injunction hearing occurred due to appellee's delay or 
requests for continuance of the hearing. (R. 1207). Fees incurred 
during that delay should not be awarded as fees in this matter. 
In Birch Creek Irrigation Company v. Prothero. 858 P.2d 990 
(Utah 1993), the Utah Supreme Court addressed a similar 
circumstances where a hearing on a restraining order was delayed 
and where the trial court failed to comply with the rule's 
requirement that "the reasons for the extension shall be entered of 
record." The Prothero Court held that "in light of these failings, 
we hold up the temporary restraining order expired by its terms and 
is therefore no longer in effect." Id. at 995. Accordingly, 
Miller and Kimball should not be awarded fees incurred after the 
temporary injunction had expired by its own terms. 
The trial court also failed to distinguish between allowable 
and non-allowable fees. The trial court heard arguments and 
considered memoranda on many issues other than the request for 
preliminary injunctions. There was a Motion to Dismiss and a 
Motion to Set Aside the Default Judgment. There were several new 
substantive issues bearing on Appellees1 right to continue with the 
foreclosure, in light of the events occurring after Default 
Judgment. The trial court improperly lumped all of the attorney's 
13 
fees incurred for all of these substantive issues as preliminary 
injunction fees. This Court observed in Tholen v. Sandy City, 84 9 
P.2d 592 (Utah App. 1993) that the type of legal services for which 
attorneys1 fees may be awarded is very narrow. This Court held 
therein: 
[4] Although Rule 65A justifies awarding 
attorney fees to wrongfully enjoined parties, 
those parties are only entitled to "fees . . . 
incurred in defending against wrongfully 
obtained injunctive relief" and not to fees 
incurred in litigating the underlying lawsuit 
associated with an injunction. Saunders v. 
Sharp, 793 P.2d 927, 933 (Utah App. 1990), 
remanded on other grounds, 806 P.2d 198 (Utah 
1991) . See also Beard v. Dugdale, 741 P.2d 
968, 969 (Utah App. 1987) (fees incurred 
preparing and arguing summary judgment were 
not properly awarded because they were not 
incurred as a result of the injunction). 
Thus, in the present case, Andy is entitled 
only to those attorney fees which would not 
have been incurred but for the application 
for, and the issuance of, the preliminary 
injunction. Fees which would have been 
incurred anyway, in the course of proving 
Sandy's entitlement to judgment and refuting 
Tholenfs defenses, are not recoverable under 
Rule 65A. (emphasis added.) 
V. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant requests this Court to reverse the lower court's 
decision denying the Motion to Dismiss, denying the Motion to Set 
Aside the Default Judgment, and the excessive award of attorney's 




D this J6 day of July, 1997 
NELSON RASMUSSEN & CHRISTENSEN 
By: 
JBruce J. Nelson, Esq. 
Russell G. Workman, Esq. 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
Martineau & Company 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This is to certify that on this J7C day of July, 1991, I 
caused to be hand delivered two true and correct copies of the 
foregoing REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT to the following: 
Bruce T. Jones 
Mark R. Gaylord 
SUITTER AXLAND 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellees 
175 S. West Temple #700 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
j. 
bjn\martinea\judge\replybrf.pie 
15 
